Course for dedollarization: what is waiting for the relations between Russia and China in 2021

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Course for dedollarization: what is waiting for the relations between Russia and China in 2021 3431_1
Course for dedollarization: what is waiting for the relations between Russia and China in 2021

In the course of a large press conference on January 18, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov affected the relationship between Moscow with Beijing, noting their close cooperation, including the UN. In turn, in the Chinese Foreign Ministry said that bilateral relations "were baptized by a new coronaviru pandemic and withstood the test with change." In 2021, it marks 20 years since the signing of an updated agreement on good neighborliness, friendship and cooperation. As the official representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China Hua Chunin, on this occasion in the new year Beijing intends to promote bilateral relations "with a higher starting point, on a larger scale and at a deeper level." What does this mean and in which direction will develop the interaction of Russia and China in 2021, analyzed the expert of the Center for the study of integration prospects Vladimir Nezhdan.

Although the beginning of 2020 was promised positive expectations, the coronavirus pandemic became the "black swan", which had an impact on all parties as world politics in general and Russian-Chinese interaction in particular. The unilateral decision on the closure of the Russian-Chinese border, incidents with the CNR citizens at the first time of the tightening of measures to combat a pandemic and a large-scale fall in the world rates of economic growth have caused speculation on the impending crisis of partnership in Moscow and Beijing. Nevertheless, Russia and PRC managed not only to preserve the achieved level of relationships in this difficult year, but also outline the prospects for strengthening cooperation at 2021, which was reflected in the joint communique at the end of the twenty-fifth regular meeting of the heads of governments of Russia and China, which took place on December 2 .

Fuel and energy sphere: new vertices

Russian-Chinese cooperation in the fuel and energy complex is gradually leading to the creation of the energy alliance of the two countries. Today, energy cooperation between Moscow and Beijing speaks one of the most sustainable factors capable of identifying regional energy conjuncture in the future, and the desire to increase bilateral trade to $ 200 billion by 2024 pushes Russia to increasing energy supplies to the PRC. The prospects for energy cooperation were listed in a joint statement of Russia and China "On the development of relations between a comprehensive partnership and strategic interaction, entering into a new era."

Energy supplies are 63% of Russia and China turnover. Cooperation in the oil and gas sphere remains the main engine of the bilateral energy dialogue. The supply of oil from Russia to China increased to 1.83 million barrels per day as of September 2020, which makes Russia the second largest supplier of oil in China: the main competitor remains Saudi Arabia, which supplies 1.9 million barrels in the PRC Raw oil per day. Er-Riyad intends to strengthen its position in the Chinese oil market, its deliveries increased by 53% compared with the indicators of August. However, imports of crude oil from the United States to China in September grew seven times annual terms.

Probably, in 2021, the PRC will continue to increase oil supplies. In September 2020, China imported by 17.6% more oil compared to 2019, and therefore Russia, the United States and Saudi Arabia competition will only grow on the Chinese oil market.

The export of Russian gas to China on the Power Siberia pipeline has lagged behind the plan. In January-August 2020, Gazprom was pumped through the pipeline of only 2.3 billion cubic meters of gas, which is less than half of the planned volume. Because of the Pandemic, China sharply reduced the consumption of natural gas, but began to form fuel reserves for the future, actively buying very cheap gas. However, it is emerging that Gazprom lacks capacity in Eastern Siberia to fulfill the contract with the PRC.

China also remains one of the main export markets for Russian coal and electricity. The main obstacle to the further growth of the supply is the underdevelopment of the borderline infrastructure. Thus, one of the key tasks for 2021 is to facilitate the completion of the construction of the Railway Bridge of Nizhneleninskoye-Tongjiang and the corresponding point of pass, as well as the development of cross-border infrastructure.

Trade and economic relations: Pandemic is not a reason for slowing down

Despite the pandemic, the Russian-Chinese trade turnover in 2020 may update the record last year, when mutual trade in Moscow and Beijing exceeded $ 110 billion.

Although cooperation in the oil and gas sphere remains a flagship of Russian-Chinese trade, sales in the PRC of agricultural goods are gradually becoming a new driver. In the first eight months of 2020, Russian exports of soybeans in China grew by 9% to 490,000 tons year in annual terms, and exporting soybean oil is 140% to 216,000 tons. In addition, the supply of meat and sub-products from Russia to China in 2020 increased by nine times, and sunflower oil - twice, the supply of Russian beef began. However, in 2021, the Russian presence in the Chinese market of soybeans and grains can be reduced due to the introduction of export duties on soybeans and quotation of wheat export, rye, barley and corn.

Moscow and Beijing intend to continue dehylarization in mutual calculations. In the first quarter of 2020, the share of the dollar in the trade turnover of Russia and the PRC was about 46%, and in 2015 the dollar occupied almost 90% of bilateral trade in Russia and the PRC. At the same time, the share of euro in bilateral calculations in the first quarter amounted to a record high level - 30%, the share of yuan is 17%, and the share of the ruble is 7%.

However, so far the CNR customs statistics speaks of a small decline in Russian-Chinese turnover. At the end of the nine months of 2020, the trade turnover of Russia and the PRC decreased by 2% compared with the same period of 2019, according to the results of ten months, trade showed a decline by 2.3%. At the same time, the trading driver acts as exports of goods from the PRC, while the dynamics of imports of Russian goods to China remains in the negative zone. Despite the slowdown in the pace of mutual trade, in December, an increase in demand for Russian energy carriers was expected, which should serve as a basis for establishing a new trade record.

As a result, the key task of Russia in 2021 becomes the consolidation of results on the diversification of trade with the PRC.

The previous two years of analysts noted the successes of Russian agricultural producers in the Chinese market due to the escalation of trading contradictions Beijing and Washington. The coming to power Joe Bayiden and the readiness of the new American administration to a more pragmatic approach in trade and economic relations with Beijing emphasizes how important for Russia in the new year to promote the signing of the Road Card on the high-quality development of Russian-Chinese trade in goods and services until 2024 , as well as strive to improve the structure, identifying new points of economic growth, further improvement of the business environment for trade and investment. In China, it is noted that further trade cooperation with Russia will be influenced by the first phase of the Trade Agreement of the PRC and the United States. Nevertheless, the adoption of a "roadmap" will make the development of bilateral trade more predictable.

Cooperation in the military-technical sphere: achievements and complexity

The assistance of Russia in the creation of a warning system for a missile attack in the PRC along with joint military exercises testifies to the unprecedented level of confidence in the parties. By providing PRC advanced technologies and teaching Chinese specialists, Russia strengthens China's position in confrontation with the United States. A feature of the Union of Russia and China can be the fact that this alliance will be aimed at reducing the risks of strengthening the political and economic pressure of Washington to Moscow and Beijing.

However, contradictions concerning the delay in the supply of S-400 systems in the summer of 2020, and the statements of Chinese diplomats on the occasion of the celebration of the 160th anniversary of Vladivostok forced many media to talk about the discrepancies in relations between Moscow and Beijing. Another factor capable of putting pressure on military cooperation of the parties may be a new supervisory winged missile "Brahmos" of the joint development of Russia and India. China is concerned about the desire of the Philippines to acquire these rockets, given that Russia is included in the delivery process.

The further dynamics of strengthening Military cooperation between Moscow and Beijing, depending on the basis of the parties, to build interest balances in such a way that, on the one hand, to prevent over-all-friendly dependence, and on the other, it is possible to ensure the possibility of diversifying military-technical cooperation with other countries without harm For bilateral relations.

On the other hand, one of the main events of 2020 can be considered the extension of Russia and China Agreement on notifications on launch launches for 10 years. This shows not only the high level of confidence, but also the readiness of the PRC to keep a dialogue on global arms control. The extension of the agreement between Moscow and Beijing may have an impact on the new US administration and make it more flexible in matters of discussion of arms control.

Beijing's desire to enlist the support of Moscow is associated with the concerns of the American-European Union, aimed at restraining the PRC. In particular, NATO is increasingly talking about the development of China's military potential as a threat to the development and existence of the Alliance.

Main Challenge - Public Dialogue

The Chinese Foreign Ministry noted that the priority of China's diplomatic agenda in 2021 will be strengthened with strategic ties with Russia. However, despite the successes in the political, economic and military-technical spheres, Russia and the PRC, it is not possible to establish a qualitative public dialogue. At the public level, the Russians retain a two-way attitude to China.

In September 2020, Levada Center published the results of surveys that demonstrate the dual perception of the PRC and the Chinese among Russians. On the one hand, the view is that China performs the closest friend of Russia, 40% of respondents share. According to this indicator, China lags behind only Belarus who scored 58%. At the same time, the indicator towards the PRC is depending on the state of relations between Russia and the West. So, until 2014, no more than 24% of Russians were willing to call China ally of Russia. At the personal level, most Russians are not ready for close relations with people from China. Only 10% of Russian residents are ready to see the Chinese among their relatives or friends. 16% do not object to the Chinese to become their neighbors or work colleagues. More than half of Russians prefer to keep CNR citizens at the maximum distance from themselves, speaking for a restriction or a complete ban on their entry into Russia.

On the other hand, an unstable epidemic situation in Russia is able to damage to Russian imagine in the PRC. In 2020, China repeatedly closed the border with Russia to ensure epidemic security, which led to interruptions with the supply of goods across the border, especially in the regions of the Far East. Refusal to introduce quarantine measures in Russia, along with the preservation of a negative epidemic situation, can lead to the creation of a negative image of a country in the Chinese public consciousness. As a result, this can lead to long-term negative consequences for Russian business in China.

Thus, the issues of public perception remains the weakest of Russian-Chinese relations.

The main danger of such a situation is to accumulate contradictions that can lead to a deterioration in bilateral relations under pressure from the public. As a result, the main task for Moscow and Beijing for 2021 remains working to strengthen public dialogue, so that the success of cooperation achieved by interacting at the highest level has not become hostages of public distrust and prejudice.

Vladimir Nezhdanov, Master of International Relations, Expert Center for Study Integration Prospects

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