In February 2021, the Belarusian leadership voiced a number of new emphasis in foreign policy. During the All-Belarusian Assembly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belarus Vladimir Makay for the refusal of the desire for neutrality enshrined in the Constitution. And according to the results of the presidents of Russia and Belarus, Vladimir Putin and Alexander Lukashenko, the parties returned to the study of the "road maps" on the deepening of integration in the Union State. In an exclusive interview with Eurasia.Expert, the Chairman of the Committee of the Federation Council on International Affairs, Konstantin Kosachev, analyzed how constitutional reform in Belarus and the new round of integration negotiations will affect future Russian-Belarusian relations.
- Konstantin Iosifovich, February 11, during the All-Belarusian People's Assembly, the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belarus Vladimir Makay said that "the desire for neutrality enshrined in the Constitution does not correspond to the current situation." What, in your opinion, this statement is dictated, and what does it mean for Russia?
- I participated in the All-Belarusian People's Assembly and, of course, drew attention to this statement by the minister. It was supported in the final speech by the President of Belarus of Mr. Lukashenko, although, emphasized, this is not yet a decision, but one of the ideas that can be used in the preparation of the new edition of the Belarusian Constitution. There is still a lot of things to happen throughout the year of work on this new project - the referendum is supposed to be organized at the beginning of next year. So I would like to clarify that while this is an idea, and its incarnation will ultimately depend on the will of the citizens of Belarus.
If we speak essentially, then, calling things by your own names, this norm of the current Constitution of Belarus actually has long been separated from real reality. Belarus is a full and full-fledged participant in the Union State, and in the framework of it, of course, programs are being implemented that are not compatible with the neutral status of any state.
Secondly, Belarus is a full-fledged and full member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and this is the defense union, a military organization, that is, also a design that de facto is contrary to the stated Belarusian status of neutrality. Therefore, in my opinion, this proposal contains not so much the idea to somehow revise the real, now the existing policy of Belarus in the field of security is not about this. And it's about bringing the rules of the Belarusian Constitution in line with reality, with real policies of Belarus in the field of security. This policy went further, and I don't see anything alarming in this, this is a completely normal dynamics, the development of the foundations of the constitutional system of Belarus in the sphere specified by me, and I confess that I do not see any practical consequences for the implementation of this policy. It is already quite clearly oriented on Russia and to other states that are allies of Belarus on the CSTO and, I think it will remain in the future, when and if this norm disappears from the current constitution.
- At the same time, President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko confirmed the preservation of the republic's course for multi-vector policies. How is the multi-vector policy of Belarus perceived in Russia, and what effect on the dynamics of bilateral relations?
- Let's start with the fact that Belarus is a sovereign state, and Russia never questioned its sovereignty. Belarus has the right to spend the external policies that she considers it necessary. If you cling to terminology, you can provoke problems where there are really no. We do not call Russian foreign foreign policy, but in fact this term is used in many Russian doctrinal documents, and de facto our policy is also multi-vector, we are developing it in Western and East, and in the southern direction, and are ready to go in this Our interaction with the surrounding world is so far as our partners are ready for this.
But for us, of course, it is always important to arrange priorities in this cooperation, that is, here is more important than the vectors and not the direction, but priorities. We arrange them extremely clearly, and one of the obvious priorities is to build as much as possible allied relations with the Republic of Belarus. Until the same focus on Belarusian's foreign policy, and the President of Belarus on his main speech on the All-Belarusian People's Assembly identified Russia as the main strategic partner, as long as it is not only the slogan, and concrete, I do not see any problems with how Belarus denotes its foreign policy and with how it builds their relationships with third countries. We know that Belarus has a strategic partnership with the PRC, we know that it is interested in developing relations with its Western neighbors, including those in the EU and NATO. I repeat once again - until it feels in our relations, the project for the implementation of the Union State of Russia and Belarus, all this is the plots that should have a subordinate attitude towards what we do in realities in practice.
- In your opinion, are Belarus actually in the new edition of the Constitution to fix the rate on the activation of integration construction in the Union State and EAEU?
- Once again I repeat the thesis from which I started. Belarus is a sovereign state, and the only one who is entitled to determine the content of the Belarusian Constitution is the Belarusian people. I think that for us in Russia would be wrong to initiate some kind of own vision of the Constitution of Belarus, which should be in it, and what should not. We must respect the sovereignty of Belarus.
I confess that, of course, we would like to be much higher rates in the development and allied state, and our integration within the framework of the EAEU, and within the framework of the CST, and within the CIS, and we are ready to prepare to this.
But if we begin to dictate our vision of the integration of our integration partners, we will thereby provoke additional problems, and not solve existing ones. We never do this, we go ahead exactly the rates that are acceptable and interesting to other participants in integration. In the Union State - this is Belarus, in EAEU - these are four partners for Russia, in the CSTO - five, in the CIS of their ten, but in each case we are ready to take into account interests in this integration of those who participate in it. And how our partners determine their attitude to this integration by fastening it in their national constitutions or in some segment of legislation, in declarations taken by national parliaments or in political programs of parties - all this should be the sovereign right of each country -parteen integration. Therefore, give some recommendations to Belarusian partners about what should be included in their constitution, and what should not, we will not definitely not definitely, with the understanding that the Russian side is extremely clearly and exhaustively fix your willingness to the highest pace. Promotion forward integration processes.
- What scenarios may develop a situation in Belarus and in Russian-Belarusian relations in the near future? What results should be expected from the negotiations of the presidents of Belarus and Russia?
- The fact that these negotiations took place is a sign that we are in a constant dialogue, and that this dialogue is particularly interested in the dialogue, no matter how they try to interfere with this dialogue. Therefore, I can only welcome the fact of the meeting. According to the results of this meeting, and with that, and on the other hand, new additional instructions were given to the governments and security councils, parliamentary structures (of course, this is not instructions, but recommendations). And all this suggests that the dialogue is not a declarative, but a specific and pragmatic, applied, and I have satisfaction.
Our relationships will move progressively, we do not definitely not definitely not definitely, but we try to specify. And now at the final stage there is a very large analytical work in order to determine the strategic vision of the prospects of our joint movement forward.
It is clear that from the moment of signing the Treaty on the Union State, more than a quarter of a century has passed, and some positions are implemented. And some positions are not implemented, because we do not refund some - because life has gone forward and it turned out that one or another agreement no longer corresponds to either the interests of the parties, or their understanding of how we need to coexist together. We are absolutely interested in the continuation of the United States project, this project is successful and that it has a great promising future. Yes, first, of course, the economy (and President Lukashenko constantly says about it), I do not see the need to argue with it. On our side there is a willingness to distribute our interaction at a greater number of new spheres, but if the Belarusian side is not ready for this, it means that it takes another additional time, and it will definitely come.
- What are the prospects for the adoption of road maps to deepen integration in the Union State, and what can they change in Russian-Belarusian relations?
- I will refrain from commenting on specific schedules of work on these road maps (after all, this is the work of the work of specialized ministries and departments, the governments of the two countries, of course, the Union Committee). We, parliamentarians, always provide possible assistance in this work if ratification requires, we prepare them in predominantly priority mode. For the rest, I can only confirm that the work is carried out very serious and very active and discussions around this work, apparent and superficial, significantly larger than those who remain in the merits between the approaches of the parties. Disagreements are preserved, but they are working and consistently removed from the agenda.
Announced Maria Mamzelkina